Martin Fiebig
| Martin Fiebig | |
|---|---|
| Born | 7 May 1891 Rösnitz, German Empire |
| Died | 23 October 1947 (aged 56) Belgrade, Yugoslavia |
| Allegiance |
 German Empire (to 1918) Weimar Republic (to 1933) Nazi Germany
|
| Service/branch |
 Luftwaffe
|
| Years of service | 1910–45 |
| Rank | General der Flieger |
| Commands held |
KG 4 VIII Fliegerkorps |
| Battles/wars |
World War I World War II |
| Awards | Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves |
Martin Fiebig (7 May 1891 – 23 October 1947) was a German Luftwaffe general (General der Flieger) who commanded several air corps and equivalent-sized formations during World War II. He was a recipient of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves, awarded by Nazi Germany to recognise extreme battlefield bravery or successful military leadership.
After World War II had ended, Fiebig was extradited to Yugoslavia, where he was tried and convicted of war crimes, specifically for his role in the bombing of Belgrade in April 1941. Fiebig was sentenced to death and executed in 1947.
Martin Fiebig was born on 7 May 1891 in Rösnitz, Upper Silesia. He served in World War I, and was promoted to Oberleutnant on 18 June 1915. From August 1914 to 1915, he served in the 18th Infantry Regiment. Sometime during 1915, he was transferred from the infantry to become a pilot. From 1915 to 1 August 1918, he was a pilot and Squadron-Leader in the 3rd Bomber Wing.
In May 1925, Fiebig, now a Hauptmann (captain), led a team of seven expert German World War I pilots (known as Gruppe Fiebig) to the Soviet Union, where they were employed as special air force advisers and instructors at various training schools in the Moscow area. Fiebig himself was seconded to the command staff of the Zhukovsky Air Force Academy. Despite his formal role, his input into the training of Soviet pilots was quite limited; for example, he had no control over the practical exercises undertaken by the students. His position did enable him to draw conclusions about Soviet air training, doctrine and strategy. He observed that Soviet air training was too focussed on the quantity of pilots produced, and that there were significant deficiencies in theoretical instruction. Moreover, his observations about the deficiencies of Soviet air training were echoed by the deputy director of the Academy. Further, Fiebig concluded that Soviet air doctrine was confused, largely due to the limited experience of the Soviet Union in air operations during World War I. He also recognised that Soviet air strategy was reactive, in sharp contrast to that of other European powers, especially Germany. According to the author Samuel Mitcham, in the late 1920s Fiebig was trained in close air support techniques at the clandestine German air training school in the Soviet Union.
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