Monroe v. Pape | |
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Argued 8 November, 1960 Decided 20 February, 1961 |
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Full case name | Monroe, et al. v. Pape, et al. |
Citations | 365 U.S. 167 (more)
81 S. Ct. 473; 5 L. Ed. 2d 492; 1961 U.S. LEXIS 1687
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Court membership | |
Case opinions | |
Majority | Douglas, joined by Warren, Black, Clark, Harlan, Brennan, Whittaker, Stewart |
Concurrence | Harlan, joined by Stewart |
Dissent | Frankfurter |
Laws applied | |
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 of the "Ku Klux Act" of 20 April 1871 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983) | |
Overruled by
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Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (in part) |
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), was a United States Supreme Court case that considered the application of federal civil rights law to constitutional violations by city employees. The case was significant because it held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statutory provision from 1871, could be used to sue state officers who violated a plaintiff's constitutional rights. § 1983 had previously been a relatively obscure and little-used statute, but since Monroe it has become a central part of United States civil rights law.
Thirteen police officers of the City of Chicago, Illinois broke into the residence of the Monroe family. The officers roused the parents from their bed and made them stand naked in the living room while other officers ransacked every room of the house, emptying drawers and ripping mattress covers. Mr. Monroe was then taken to the police station and interrogated concerning a two-day-old murder case. He was not allowed to make any telephone calls or to contact a lawyer during his interrogation. He was not charged and was finally released. The police had not acted under authority of a search warrant or an arrest warrant when making the raid.
Plaintiffs Monroe (six African American children and their parents) sued the police officers and the City of Chicago for violating their civil rights under §1983.
The City of Chicago moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it could not be held liable under the Civil Rights Acts for acts committed in performance of its governmental functions.
The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint against the city itself, finding that Congress had not intended the word "person" in section 1983 to apply to municipalities. This aspect of Monroe was later partially overruled in Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) which held that local governments were "persons" under the act and could face liability under certain circumstances.