Runkle v. United States
| Runkle v. United States | |
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| Decided May 27, 1887 | |
| Full case name | Runkle v. United States |
| Citations | 122 U.S. 543 (more) |
| Holding | |
| That the president cannot delegate the power vested in him to pass finally upon the sentence because he is the only person to whom has been committed the judicial power of making a final determination. | |
| Court membership | |
Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543 (1887), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States determined that the president cannot delegate the power vested in him to approve the proceedings and sentence of a court-martial because the president is the only person bestowed with the judicial power of making a final determination.
Benjamin Piatt Runkle, a Civil War veteran who was wounded at the Battle of Shiloh, was, from 1867 to 1870, serving as an active duty army major and disbursing officer of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands (the Freedmen's Bureau) for the State of Kentucky. In 1870, he was placed on the retired list as a major, but continued as a disbursing officer, until he was arrested for trial before a court-martial. The court-martial found Runkle guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman and of violating the March 2, 1863, c. 67, § 1, Act of Congress. His sentence was imprisonment, payment of a fine, and dismissal from the army, where he had been serving on the retired list and drawing retired pay. The Secretary of War, W. W. Belknap, reviewed the proceedings and in 1873 issued an order approving Runkle's conviction, but in consideration of his war service and wounds, granted Runkle executive clemency in the name of the President and eliminated the fine and prison sentence. However, his dismissal from the army remained in effect. Under the law at that time, any court martial sentence involving an officer's dismissal in peacetime needed to be confirmed by the President and there was no indication in this order that the conviction was confirmed by President Ulysses S. Grant.
On the same day that he was cashiered, Runkle petitioned President Grant, complaining that his sentence had not been confirmed by the President himself. This petition was referred by Grant to the Judge Advocate General for review. President Grant did nothing further in the matter, and it remained open when President Rutherford B. Hayes came into office. Hayes then took it up as unfinished business and entered an order of disapproval, revoking the 1873 order dismissing Runkle.
The August 4, 1877 executive order of President Hayes, disapproving the conviction, details the history:
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, August 4, 1877.
In the Matter of the Application of Major Benjamin P. Runkle, U. S. Army, (retired.)
The record of official action heretofore taken in the premises shows the following facts, to-wit: First. That on the fourteenth of October, 1872, Major Runkle was found guilty by court-martial upon the following charges, to-wit: 'Charge 1. Violation of the act of congress approved March 2, 1863, c. 67, 1. Charge 2. Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.' Second. That on the sixteenth of January 1873, W. W. Belknap, then secretary of war, approved the proceedings of said court, and thereupon caused general order No. 7, series of 1873, to issue from the war department, by which it was announced that Major Benjamin P. Runkle was cashiered from the military service of the United States. Third. That subsequent to the date of said general order No. 7, to-wit, on the sixteenth day of January 1873, Major Runkle presented to the president a petition, setting forth that the proceedings of said court had not been approved by the president of the United States, as required by law; that said conviction was unjust; that the record of said proceedings was not in form or substance sufficient in law to warrant the issuing of said order; and asking the revocation and annulment of the same. Fourth. That, in pursuance of this petition, the record of the official action theretofore had in the premises was, by direction of the president, Ulysses S. Grant, referred to the judge advocate general of the United States army for review and report. Fifth. That thereupon the judge advocate general reviewed the case, and made his report thereon, in which it is reported and determined, among other things, that, in the proceedings had upon the trial of the case by said court, 'it is nowhere affirmatively established that he (Major Runkle) actually appropriated any money to his own use.' It also appears in said report that the conviction of said Runkle, upon charge one as aforesaid, is sustained upon the opinion that sufficient proof of the crime of embezzlement on the part of the accused was disclosed by the evidence before the court. And with respect to charge two no reference to the same is made in said report, except to deny the sufficiency of the evidence in the case, for a conviction upon the fourteenth specification thereof; and it is to be observed that the thirteen remaining specifications under this charge are identical with the thirteen specifications under charge one. The judge advocate general further finds and determines in said report as follows, to-wit: 'For alleged failures to pay, or to pay in full,' on the part of the subagents, 'I am of the opinion that the accused cannot justly be held liable.' Sixth. That no subsequent proceedings have been had with reference to said report, and that the said petition of said Runkle now awaits further and final action thereon. Whereupon, having caused the said record, together with said report, to be laid before me, and having carefully considered the same, I am of opinion that the said conviction is not sustained by the evidence in the case, and the same, together with the sentence of the court thereon, are hereby disapproved; and it is directed that said order No. 7, so far as it relates to said Runkle, be revoked.
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