Williams v Compair Maxam Ltd
| Williams v Compair Maxam Ltd | |
|---|---|
| Court | Employment Appeal Tribunal |
| Decided | 22 January 1982 |
| Citation(s) | [1982] ICR 156 |
| Case opinions | |
| Browne-Wilkinson J | |
| Keywords | |
| Unfair dismissal | |
Williams v Compair Maxam Ltd [1982] ICR 156 is a UK labour law case, concerning unfair dismissal, now governed by the Employment Rights Act 1996.
Compair Maxam Ltd was losing business. Departmental managers picked teams of core staff who could be retained to keep the business viable. They chose on personal preference for what they thought would be good for the company, but the union was not consulted. Other employees were dismissed for redundancy and given money beyond statutory minima. Five workers claimed dismissal was unfair.
The Tribunal dismissed the claims, saying that the managers’ preferences were a reasonable way of doing the job. This was appealed on grounds of .
Browne-Wilkinson J said that there was an error of law by reaching a conclusion so perverse on the facts. The dismissal selection was unfair, ‘the correct approach is to consider whether an industrial tribunal, properly directed in law and properly appreciating what is currently regarded as fair industrial practice, could have reached the decision reached by the majority of this tribunal. We have reached the conclusion that it could not.’ His judgment was as follows.
In considering whether the decision of an industrial tribunal is perverse in a legal sense, there is one feature which does not occur in other jurisdictions where there is a right of appeal only on a point of law. The Industrial Tribunal is an industrial jury which brings to its task a knowledge of industrial relations both from the view point of the employer and the employee. Matters of good industrial relations practice are not proved before an industrial tribunal as they would be proved before an ordinary court: the lay members are taken to know them. The lay members of the Industrial Tribunal bring to their task their expertise in a field where conventions and practices are of the greatest importance. Therefore in considering whether the decision of an industrial tribunal is perverse, it is not safe to rely solely on the common sense and knowledge of those who have no experience in the field of industrial relations. A course of conduct which to those who have no practical experience with industrial relations might appear unfair or unreasonable, to those with specialist knowledge and experience might appear both fair and reasonable: and vice versa.
For this reason, it seems to us that the correct approach is to consider whether an industrial tribunal, properly directed in law and properly appreciating what is currently regarded as fair industrial practice, could have reached the decision reached by the majority of this tribunal. We have reached the conclusion that it could not....
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